California Western School of Law

CWSL Scholarly Commons
Faculty Scholarship
2016

Madonnas and Whores in the Workplace
Jessica Fink
California Western School of Law, jkb@cwsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons

Recommended Citation
Jessica Fink, Madonnas and Whores in the Workplace, 22 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 255 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs/195

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

MADONNAS AND WHORES IN THE WORKPLACE
Jessica Fink*

ABSTRACT
Much has been written about “lookism” – the preferential treatment given to those who
conform to societal standards of beauty. But in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, a
gender discrimination plaintiff alleged a sort of “reverse-lookism,” claiming that her male
employer terminated her long-term employment because the employee was too physically
attractive, thus tempting the employer to think about entering into an extramarital affair. To the
great surprise of many who followed this case, the Iowa Supreme Court sided with the employer,
declining to find him liable for gender discrimination. As one might expect, uproar ensued, with
the media, the public, and the academic community eviscerating the court for its failure to
recognize and rectify gender discrimination. In story after story, reporters, academics and
pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s
“uncontrollable lust.” Yet while such characterizations made for catchy headlines, they were
not quite true: The court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender
roles, but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.
This article picks up where the Iowa Supreme Court left off, exploring the complicated
reasons behind this employee’s failure to win her case, and suggesting alternate theories under
which a similarly-situated employee successfully could challenge this type of termination. The
article also probes the reasons behind the vehement (and often misinformed) public reaction to
this case. It explores the ways in which the media systematically misrepresents women,
particularly in the context of suits involving workplace gender discrimination, and examines the
consequences of these errors, arguing that attempts to force women in the public eye into one of
two molds – either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually promiscuous and vilified –
has dramatic consequences for other employees in the workplace, for policymakers, and for the
public at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Appearance matters. In a variety of settings – social, professional, academic, and even
familial – a person’s physical appearance impacts the treatment that he or she receives.
Conventional wisdom dictates that “the beautiful people” come out on top in these interactions –
that those who comport with accepted standards of physical attractiveness generally receive
preferential treatment 1. Yet in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, Nelson v. James H.
Knight, DDS, P.C., 2 a plaintiff attempted to turn this conventional wisdom on its head, claiming
that her married, male employer terminated her long-term employment because she was too
physically attractive, thus tempting the employer to think about entering into an extramarital
affair with her. 3 To prove her case, the plaintiff not only cited her former employer’s admission
that he fired Ms. Nelson because “their relationship had become a detriment to [his] family,” 4
but also provided evidence of numerous graphic and sexual comments that Dr. Knight had made
toward her during her employment 5 – comments that Dr. Knight did not deny. 6 Despite this
evidence, however, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, declining to find Dr.
Knight liable for gender discrimination. 7 According to the court, Ms. Nelson was not terminated
due to her gender, but rather due to the consensual relationship between herself and Dr. Knight –
a reason that was not deemed to be “because of a gender-specific characteristic.” 8
In the wake of this decision, observers from all facets of the legal and social landscape
responded with ire: The media, the public, and the academic community all leveled harsh
criticism at this (coincidentally, all-male) Iowa Supreme Court for its apparent failure to
recognize and rectify gender discrimination. 9 In story after story, reporters, academics and
pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001; B.A., University of
Michigan, 1997. I am grateful to my colleagues at California Western School of Law for their input regarding an
earlier draft of this paper. Many thanks also to Mallory Holt for her excellent and thorough research assistance.
1
See infra notes 11-18 and associated text.
2
Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (hereinafter, “Nelson”). Notably, this was the second opinion that
the Iowa Supreme Court issued in this case. In December 2012, the Iowa Supreme Court first issued a decision
affirming summary judgment to Dr. Knight. See, Nelson v. Knight, No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *1 (Iowa
2012) (hereinafter “Nelson withdrawn opinion”). As discussed in greater detail below, the Iowa Supreme Court
subsequently withdrew this initial decision and issued a second opinion in July 2013, in response to a petition for
rehearing, but did so without any oral argument or rebriefing. See Nelson, supra, at *65 n.1; see also The
Irresistible Woman Meets The Incorrigible Court: Iowa Supreme Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in
“Irresistible Attraction” Case, JonathanTurley.org (Blog), 2013 WL 17203377, July 15, 2013.
3
See Nelson, supra note _ at 66.
4
Id.
5
See id. at 65-66.
6
See id.
7
See id. at 65.
8
Id.
9
See infra Section III.A. For purposes of this paper, the terms “gender” and “sex” shall be used interchangeably.
See, e.g., Francine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”: The Evolving Legal Riddle of Sexual vs.
Gender Identity, 32 J. OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. LAW 361, 365 (2006) (stating that “[b]ecause Congress intended that
the term ‘sex’ in Title VII mean simply ‘man’ or ‘woman,’ there is no need to distinguish between the terms ‘sex’
and ‘gender’ in Title VII cases”) (quotations in original); but see id. (noting that “[s]ome academic writers… week
to maintain or to heighten a distinction between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender,’…”) (quotations in original) (citations
omitted).

“uncontrollable lust.” 10 Yet while this ire created a convenient story for the press – a compelling
way of framing this case – it ultimately was a misleading account of the Court’s decision. The
Iowa Supreme Court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender roles,
but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.
So why did everyone get this case so wrong? How did so many “experts” in the field and
so many members of the media either misunderstand (or perhaps willfully misrepresent) the
nuanced reasons behind Ms. Nelson’s failure to win her case? This article not only reexamines
the facts at issue in Nelson and tries to frame the outcome of this case in a more logical and
defensible light, but also endeavors to understand the reasons for the often-flawed coverage of
this lawsuit. Part I of this article will provide a more thorough description of the Nelson case,
explaining the Court’s opinion not in the simplistic and divisive terms adopted by the media and
others in the wake of this decision, but rather by citing the legal precedent and factual basis for
this result. Part I also will place this case in a context with other examples of women who have
claimed that they were penalized for being “too attractive” for their workplaces. Part II builds
upon this broader context by examining how plaintiffs like Nelson, who believe that they have
been terminated due to their (attractive) appearance, might prevail in bringing gender
discrimination claims, by providing several theories under which such plaintiffs might succeed.
Part III examines the media’s role in this case, looking at the reasons behind the vehement – and
often misinformed – public reaction that this lawsuit generated. This Part explores the ways in
which the media systematically misrepresents women, particularly in the context of suits
involving workplace gender discrimination. It argues that women in the public eye ultimately
are forced into one of two molds – either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually
promiscuous and vilified. This article argues that creating and perpetuating this false dichotomy
has dramatic negative consequences not only for women in the workplace, but also for other
employees, for policymakers, and for the public at large.
I.

“Too Hot for the Workplace”: Nelson and Her Counterparts

Most individuals do not complain about suffering harm due to being “too attractive.”
Indeed, quite the opposite typically is true: Study after study has revealed the advantages – both
in and out of work – for individuals who meet society’s definition of beauty. 11 For example,
studies show that we ascribe a host of positive traits to physically attractive individuals,
assuming that such individuals “[are] happier, possess more socially desirable personalities,
practice more prestigious occupations, and exhibit higher marital competence.” 12 We view
10

See infra Section III.A.
See generally William R. Corbett, Hotness Discrimination: Appearance Discrimination as a Mirror for
Reflecting on the Body of Employment Discrimination Law, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 615 (2011); Enbar Toledano, The
Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 683
(2013); see also Michael Kimmel, Fired for Being Beautiful, NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 2013; cf. Ashley Robin
Brown, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who are You to Say Who is Fairest of Them All?, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J.
54 (2013) (examining the weaknesses in the argument that more attractive individuals enjoy greater advantages).
12
See Toledano, supra note 11, at 692; see also id. at 683 (noting that “we not only value beauty in the abstract, but
we also generally believe that beautiful people are, in fact, better people”); Corbett, supra note11, at 625 (citation
omitted) (noting that “[r]ecent research indicates that there is a high correlation between beauty and happiness, with
a significant part of the happiness attributable to the beautiful person’s higher earnings, and the higher earnings of
the beautiful person’s beautiful spouse”).
11

beautiful people as more competent and more socially graceful than their less attractive peers. 13
Physically attractive individuals tend to have more friends, more sex, and more money than those
who lack such beauty. 14
This “beauty advantage” often becomes particularly pronounced at work. Employers
tend to hire physically attractive job candidates more frequently than their less attractive peers,
and tend to offer higher starting salaries to these more attractive individuals. 15 Once on the job,
attractive employees continue to garner benefits: They tend to receive more favorable
performance reviews, 16 receive higher pay, 17 and receive promotions at a more frequent rate. 18
Attractive employees thus seem to climb the corporate ladder more quickly than their peers,
placing one (well manicured) foot in front of the other in a manner that may seem effortless to
the casual observer.
This prevailing wisdom makes it easy to dismiss complaints like those lodged by Ms.
Nelson – complaints that her physical beauty placed her at a disadvantage in the workplace, and
ultimately led to her termination. Yet in both Nelson and in other similar cases, female
employees have tried to allege unlawful gender discrimination on precisely this basis, arguing
that they received adverse treatment for being too attractive for their jobs.
A.

Nelson v. Knight: Fired for Being “Too Hot” for Her Job?

In 1999, Melissa Nelson began working as a dental hygienist for Iowa dentist James
Knight. 19 Over the course of the next decade, Nelson and Knight enjoyed a collegial
relationship: Nelson apparently performed her work duties well, and Knight treated Nelson with
respect and integrity. 20 According to Nelson, however, in or around 2009, her relationship with
Dr. Knight underwent changes. 21 Knight began to complain about the clothing that Nelson wore
to work, describing it as too tight, revealing, and “distracting.” 22 He told Nelson that it was “not
good for [him] see [Nelson] wearing things that accentuate her body.” 23 Knight and Nelson also
began sending text messages to each other regarding both work and personal matters. 24 Both
parties apparently played a role in initiating these text messages, and neither ever objected to the
other’s text messages. 25 While many of these messages involved innocuous issues, such as
discussions regarding their children’s activities, the messages eventually took on a more sexual

13

See Kimmel, supra note 11.
See id.; see also Brown, supra note 11, at 57 (citations omitted).
15
See Toledano, surpa note 11 at 684, 694. (citations omitted)
16
See id. at 694 (citation omitted).
17
See Kimmel, supra note 11 (citing one economic study that found a “5 percent bonus” for employees who fall
within the top third of the “looks department” (as assessed by a set of observers), as compared to a 7 to 9% penalty
for those in the bottom 9%).
18
See Toledano, supra note 11, at 684 (citation omitted).
19
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 65.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
Id. (quotations in original).
23
Id.
24
See id.
25
See id.
14

tone. 26 Knight told Nelson that “if she ever saw his pants bulging, she would know her clothing
was too revealing.” 27 He texted Nelson to ask how often she experienced orgasms. 28 When
Nelson once commented regarding the infrequency in her sex life, Knight told her “[t]hat’s like
having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.” 29 While Knight initiated the sexual
content in these exchanges, Nelson apparently never asked Knight not to text her, and never
indicated that she was offended by these conversations. 30 Nelson also admitted that she once
texted Knight to tell him that “[t]he only reason I stay is because of you,” 31 and admitted that a
coworker was jealous of the manner in which Nelson and Knight got along. 32
Dr. Knight’s wife (who also worked in her husband’s dental practice) eventually
discovered that her husband and Nelson had been texting each other. 33 Stating that she viewed
Nelson as “a big threat to our marriage,” Mrs. Knight demanded that her husband terminate
Nelson’s employment. 34 After considering his wife’s request and conferring with their pastor,
Dr. Knight eventually fired Nelson, telling Nelson that “their relationship had become a
detriment to [his] family and that for the best interest of [himself] and his family and Nelson and
her family, the two of them should not work together.” 35 When later pressed by Nelson’s
husband, Dr. Knight admitted that Nelson was “the best dental assistant that he ever had,” 36 and
acknowledged that Nelson “had not done anything wrong or inappropriate.” 37 He also said that
he was “worried he was getting to personally attached to [Nelson], and that he “feared he would
try to have an affair with her down the road if he did not fire her.” 38
Nelson sued Knight under Section 216.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Code, which prohibits an
employer from discharging any employee because of that employee’s sex. 39 Just as under the
comparable antidiscrimination language found within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 40 the court noted that its inquiry involved determining whether sex was “a
motivating factor” in any adverse action taken against the plaintiff. 41 Knight argued that
Nelson’s sex was not a motivating factor in her termination: He said that the nature of his
relationship with Nelson and the threat this relationship imposed on his marriage, and not
26

See id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
28
See id.
29
Id.
30
See id. at 65; see also id. at 66.
31
Id. at 65-66.
32
See id. at 65.
33
Id.at 66.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 67 (citation omitted). As discussed in greater detail below, Nelson only asserted a gender discrimination
claim related to her termination. See infra notes 63-65, 100-15 and accompanying text. She did not assert any claim
of sexual harassment, despite the sexual and often graphic nature of Knight’s texts to her. See id.
40
The Nelson court noted that in evaluating discrimination claims under Iowa Code Chapter 216, it looks to federal
law as guidance, including Title VII. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 67 (citation omitted).
41
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (stating that “[g]enerally, an employer engages in unlawful sex
discrimination when the employer takes adverse action against an employee and sex is a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision”).
27

Nelson’s gender, were his motivations for terminating her employment. 42 Nelson, in contrast,
adopted the view that neither this relationship nor the alleged threat it imposed would have
existed if she had not been a woman. 43
In December 2012 and July 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court issued decisions affirming
summary judgment for Dr. Knight. 44 In rendering these decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court drew
upon cases that previously had declined to find gender discrimination when employers had fired
female employees who were involved in consensual personal relationships that may have
triggered some jealousy in others. 45 According to the court, it did not matter that the
relationships (and the jealousy that resulted) likely would not have existed if the plaintiffs had
been male. 46 In one Eighth Circuit case relied upon by the court, for example, a male business
owner had fired a female employee because the owner’s wife saw this employee as a threat to
her marriage. 47 Citing authority that previously had recognized that “sexual favoritism” does not
violate Title VII, 48 the court in this Eighth Circuit case had opined that if instances of sexual
favoritism did not violate Title VII (i.e., because such decisions resulted from conduct and not
gender), then treating an employee unfavorably because of this type of special relationship
likewise would not violate the law. 49 The Eighth Circuit thus had held that employment
decisions which are made based upon consensual sexual relationships should not be seen as
flowing from the gender of the parties, but rather as flowing from the relevant employees’
conduct. 50
While the district court in Nelson had deemed this Eighth Circuit precedent persuasive,
Nelson attempted to distinguish her situation. In this Eighth Circuit case, Nelson argued, the
plaintiff-employee had played an active role in creating and encouraging the threatening
relationship with her employer, pinching his rear end, and writing him notes of a sexual and
intimate nature. 51 Nelson, in contrast, claimed that she had done nothing to create her precarious
workplace situation, never flirting with Knight or initiating any sort of sexual or intimate

42

See id.
See id.
44
As described in greater detail below, see infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text, the court initially issued a
decision in December 2012, and then issued another opinion in July 2013 which withdrew the court’s first opinion
and which was substituted as the opinion of the court.. While the differences between the two opinions issued by the
court are discussed in greater detail below, the analysis in this section focuses on the court’s reasoning in its second,
July 2013 opinion, since that remains the opinion of record.
45
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 67-68 (citations omitted).
46
See id. at 67, 70.
47
See id. at 67-68 (citing Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2006)).
48
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 68 (citation omitted)); see also id. at 79 n.13 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (citing
precedent holding that “[Romantically motivated] favoritism is not based on a belief that women are better workers,
or otherwise deserve to be treated better, than men; indeed, it is entirely consistent with the opposite opinion”)
(quotations and parentheticals in original) (citations omitted).
49
See id. at 68. This line of cases assumed, however, that the conduct in question did not result from unwelcome
sexual advances or other aspects of a hostile work environment. See id. (citations omitted).
50
See id. at 68 (citations omitted).
51
See id. at 67-68 (citations omitted).
43

relationship with him. 52 In Nelson’s eyes, she was guilty of little more than simply “exist[ing] as
a female” at work. 53
The court, however, rejected Nelson’s argument. 54 In upholding the district court’s
granting of summary judgment for Dr. Knight, the court found a distinction between an
employment decision based upon a personal relationship like that between Knight and Nelson
(assuming that there was no coercion or “quid pro quo” involved), and a decision based upon
gender itself. 55 According to the court, this distinction would exist even when the “personal
relationship” at issue would not have arisen had the employee been of the opposite gender. 56 In
other words, even if Knight likely would not have developed a personal relationship with Nelson
had she been a male employee – and even if Knight’s wife may not have become jealous of a
close relationship between her husband and a male employee – a termination based upon this
relationship and the jealous it caused was not the same as termination based upon gender.
The Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, concurring in the result, elaborated on this
point, asserting that while “differential treatment based on an employee’s status as a woman
constitutes sex discrimination… differential treatment on account of conduct resulting from the
sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination claim. 57 The
Chief Justice thus noted that “an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee
because of a voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination
suit,” 58 and emphasized that this rule extended beyond relationships with actual sexual intimacy,
also including “consensual affiliations involving sexually suggestive conduct.” 59 Applying this
analysis to the instant case, the Chief Justice found that while “the absence of sexually
suggestive behavior on the part of Nelson… does factually distinguish this case from [cases

52

See id. at 65.
Id. at 69; see also id. (framing the question for the court as “whether an employee who has not engaged in
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the
boss and the employee as a threat to her marriage”) (emphasis added). The court also discussed an Eleventh Circuit
opinion, Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., where a male business owner terminated a female employee
who worked on the same crew as the business owner’s son, after the wife of this son became jealous of the female
employee. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 68-69 (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902,
903-05 (11th Cir. 1990)). Just as Nelson claimed in her case, the female employee in Platner had not played an
active role in fostering anyone’s jealousy, Platner, supra note 53, at 903-05, yet the Eleventh Circuit still declined to
find the defendant liable for gender discrimination. Id. at 905 (“It is evident that Thomas, faced with a seemingly
insoluble conflict within his family, felt he had to make a choice as to which employee to keep. He opted to place
the burden… on Platner, to whom he was not related…. [T]he ultimate basis for Platner’s dismissal was not gender
but simply favoritism for a close relative”).
54
See id. at 70-73.
55
See id. at 70, 73; see also id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (noting that “differential treatment based on an
employee’s status as a woman constitutes sex discrimination, while differential treatment on account of conduct
resulting from the sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination claim”) (citation
omitted).
56
See id. at 67; see also id. at 70.
57
Id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
58
Id. (Cady, C.J. concurring) (citation omitted)
59
Id. at 75-76 (Cady, C.J. concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. at 76 (Cady, C.J. concurring) (“When
employees are terminated due to consensual, romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with their supervisors,
courts generally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination….”).
53

rejecting sex discrimination claims based on a consensual, romantic relationship…],” 60 the threat
to the Knight’s marriage here still resulted from the consensual personal relationship between
Nelson and Dr. Knight. 61 Accordingly, he found no evidence indicating that either the
relationship between Knight and Nelson or the decision to terminate Nelson flowed from genderbased animus. 62
Significantly, both the Majority and Concurring justices in Nelson took great pains to
emphasize the very limited nature of their decision (particularly in their second, July 2013
opinion). 63 For example, the court repeatedly highlighted Nelson’s failure to assert a sexual
harassment claim in this case – a decision that the court seemed to find surprising given the
nature of Dr. Knight’s graphic communications with Nelson. 64 Indeed, at several points
throughout the opinion, the court implied that had Nelson alleged sexual harassment, the court
might have reached a different conclusion in this case. 65
Moreover, in finding no gender discrimination related to Nelson’s termination, the court
made much of the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson, including
within both the Majority and Concurring opinion reams of references to this consensual
relationship, and specifically noting that it would have reached a different conclusion had
Nelson’s relationship with Knight not been consensual. 66 The Chief Justice characterized the
60

Id. at 79 (Cady, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 80 (concur) (emphasizing that “a critical aspect of the entire
analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship”)
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id. at 65 (stating, in opinion’s opening lines, “[w]e emphasize the limits of our decision”).
64
See id. at 72 n.7 (observing that while the “record indicates that Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate
comments toward Nelson that are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases…, Nelson does not allege… that
she was a victim of sexual harassment”); see also id. at 65 (“The employee did not bring a sexual harassment or
hostile environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in this or any other
case”); see also id. at 67 (citation omitted) (“Nelson does not contend that her employer committed sexual
harassment”); id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that Knight’s comments would commonly be
viewed as inappropriate in most any setting and, for sure, beyond the reasonable parameters of workplace
interaction,” but noting that “they nevertheless were an undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship
enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight”).
65
See id. at 65 (clarifying that the court was not deciding how a sexual harassment or hostile work environment
claim would be resolved on these facts); see also id. at 72 n.7 (indicating that inappropriate comments like those
made by Knight in this case frequently support sexual harassment claims). Other observers of this case more
explicitly questioned Nelson’s decision not to allege harassment in this case in the wake of the court’s decisions.
See Fired just for being ‘too hot’ is discrimination, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Jan. 3, 2013 (responding to initial
opinion issued by Iowa Supreme Court, stating “we can’t understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender
discrimination rather than sexual harassment. It seems she could have made a stronger case for Knight having
created a hostile work environment”).
66
See Nelson, supra note 2, at 64 (“We emphasize the limits of our decision. The employee did not bring a sexual
harassment or hostile work environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in
this or any other case”); id. at 65 (observing that “[b]oth parties initiated texting” and that “[n]either objected to the
other’s texting”); id . at 66 (relaying Nelson’s admission that the does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to
text her or indicating that she found his texts offensive); id. at 67 (citing precedent which has held that “an employer
does not engage in unlawful gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is involved in a
consensual relationship that has triggered personal jealousy”) (emphasis added); id. at 70 (finding a distinction
between a decisions based upon gender and “an isolated employment decision based on personal relations (assuming
no coercion or quid pro quo”) (emphasis added); id. (citing federal caselaw holding that “adverse employment
action stemming from a consensual workplace relationship (absent sexual harassment) is not actionable under Title

consensual nature of this relationship as “a critical aspect of the [court’s] entire analysis,” 67
deeming “the consensual aspect of the relationship” to be “pivotal to the analysis of the claim of
discrimination based on a personal relationship.” 68 The court made clear that it was this
consensual relationship – conduct on the part of both Knight and Nelson – that formed the basis
for Nelson’s termination, and not merely Nelson’s gender or “existence” as a female. 69 Thus,
neither Nelson’s appearance nor her gender alone were enough to get her fired; rather, it was the
manifestation of that attractive, feminine appearance into a consensual personal relationship with
Dr. Knight – a relationship that evoked jealousy in Knight’s wife – that led to her termination.
B.

Other Employees Who Have Claimed to be “Too Hot” for their Jobs

Nelson is not alone in claiming to have suffered adverse treatment at work due to her
attractive appearance. Indeed, despite the fact that Nelson’s claim seemed to fly in the face of
extensive research that has shown the workplace advantages of physical beauty, 70 other
employees similarly have claimed to have experienced adverse treatment due to their good looks.
In 2010, for example, a banker named Debrahlee Lorenzana was fired from her position
Citibank, a termination that Lorenzana claims was due to her curvaceous figure and her
propensity to dress in a manner that accentuated her body. 71 In the lawsuit that she filed against
her former employer (which ultimately was dismissed due to the presence of an arbitration
VII”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (articulating the “general legal
principle that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a voluntary, romantic
relationship does not form the basis of a sex discrimination suit,” whether relationship involves sexual intimacy or
simply sexually-suggestive conduct) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); id. at 76 (Cady, C.J., concurring)
(stating that “[w]hen employees are terminated due to consensual, romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with
their supervisors, courts generally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination because the adverse
consequence is based upon sexual activity rather than gender”) (emphasis added); id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring)
(finding that “[t]he fact of the matter is Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her consensual personal
relationship with her employer, not because of her gender”) (emphasis added); id. (Cady, C.J., concurring)
(referencing the “consensual personal relationship” between Knight and Nelson and observing that this relationship
“extended well beyond the workplace”); id. (Cady, C.J., concurring) (characterizing Knight’s sexual banter as “an
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight”); id. at 79 (Cady, C.J.,
concurring) (holding that “a sex discrimination claim predicated on physical appearance accompanied by a
consensual personal relationship between the employee and employer requires proof that the physical appearance of
the plaintiff was the gender-based reason for the adverse employment action’”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted);
id. at 79-80 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (finding that “[t]he relationship… included enough activity and conduct to
support a determination… that Nelson was terminated as a response to the consensual personal relationship she
maintained with Dr. Knight,” and that “there was insufficient evidence tending to show that Nelson’s status as a
woman also was a motivating reason”); id. at 80 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (“It is important to observe that a critical
aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship”); id. (Cady,
C.J., concurring) (stating that “the consensual aspect of the relationship is pivotal to the analysis of the claim of
discrimination based on a personal relationship,: and holding that “[i]n this case, it is undisputed the relationship was
consensual”); id. at 80-81 (Cady, C.J., concurring) (finding that “there was insufficient evidence offered by Nelson
in light of the undisputed evidence of a consensual personal relationship that would permit a reasonable fact finder
to conclude… that Dr. Knight terminated Nelson based on her status as a woman”).
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70
See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
71
See Complaint, Lorenzana v. Citigroup Inc., No. 09116382, 2009 WL 4241578 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 20, 2009)
(hereinafter “Lorenzana Complaint”), at ¶ 6; see also Ed Pilkington, New York banker claims she was fired for
being too attractive, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2010; Corbett, supra note 11, at 615-622 (citations omitted).

agreement), 72 Lorenzana claimed that her superiors had asked her to refrain from wearing
various items of clothing (including turtleneck tops, pencil skirts, fitted business suits, or other
tailored clothing) because “as a result of the shape of her figure, such clothes were purportedly
‘too distracting’ for her male colleagues and supervisors to bear.” 73 Moreover, Lorenzana
alleged that, in response to her complaints that other female employees wore these prohibited
clothing items, Citigroup management had advised Lorenzana that the other female employees
could wear what they wished because “[their] general unattractiveness rendered moot their
sartorial choices,” 74 while Lorenzana could not allow her “shapeliness” to be “heightened by
beautifully tailored clothing.” 75
Similarly, in Willingham v. Regions Bank, 76 the plaintiff – also an attractive female
banker – claimed to have been terminated due to her attractive appearance and argued that her
termination constituted gender discrimination. 77 Willingham’s employer, in contrast, claimed
that she was terminated for violating her company’s Code of Conduct, after she appeared in a
publication as “Ms. Cruzin’ South August 2008,” appeared both on the cover and in photos
wearing a bikini and sitting on motorcycles and cars, and then distributed copies of this magazine
at work. 78 In alleging that her termination resulted from sex discrimination,79 Willingham
argued, inter alia, that the bank treated her in a different, more negative manner than a similarlysituated male employee, and she specifically pointed to a photograph of a male employee who
had not been fired after appearing shirtless and dressed in skimpy running shorts on a web site
related to a road race. 80 The court, however, rejected her claim, granting summary judgment in
favor of the bank. 81
In 2010, Amy-Erin Blakely, a former executive at a nonprofit organization called The
Devereux Foundation, sued her former employer for gender discrimination after her termination
by the nonprofit. 82 Prior to her termination, Blakely had filed two internal grievances against her
employer alleging adverse treatment due to her attractive physical appearance. 83 Among her
allegations, Blakely claimed that, prior to her termination, she had been told that other
employees could not concentrate in meetings with her “because all they saw were her ‘big
breasts’”; 84 that she had been nicknamed “Big Tittie Baby”; 85 that a high-level executive wanted
72
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Id. (internal quotations in original).
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to play tennis with her so he could see her in a tennis skirt and “see her big titties bouncing
around”; 86 and that she was “too sensual” for promotion into the position of executive director,
among other comments. 87 (The parties eventually settled this case after it was removed to federal
court.) 88
Notably, these types of claims by female plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their
attractive physical appearance seem not to be limited to the corporate workplace. Even
employees who work at job sites where one would expect tolerance (and perhaps even a
preference) for physical attractiveness or sensual attire have complained of discrimination based
upon their good looks. In 2012, for example, a data entry employee at a wholesale lingerie
company claimed to have been fired one week into her employment due to her busty figure and
allegedly racy attire. 89 The employee claimed that she was asked to tape her breasts down to
make them look smaller, and that she was told that she was “just too hot for this office” 90 –
despite her assertion that her wardrobe was “appropriate for a business that sells thongs with
hearts placed in the female genital area and boy shorts for women that say ‘hot’ in the buttocks
area.” 91 Similarly, in 2013, a New York yoga teacher claimed that she was fired from a
husband-and-wife owned chiropractic clinic where she worked after the husband told the
employee that “his wife might become jealous of her on account of being ‘too cute.’” 92 (Adding
an additional twist to this tale, the wife was herself a former Playboy Playmate.) 93
What is interesting about all of these claims is the double-edged sword that they
illustrate: In many cases, these female plaintiffs – like other women in the workplace – may
garner a wealth of benefits from their attractive physical appearance, in terms of hiring,
promotion, compensation, and other feedback. 94 Yet their attractiveness also can create
problems for them at work, placing them – as one commentator has observed – “between a rock
and a hard place... [i]nsulted and not hired if they aren’t attractive, fired if they are too
attractive.” 95 Compounding the problem, once these women are faced with this alleged
unfairness at work – purportedly receiving adverse treatment due to their appearance – they may
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20, 2013.
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receive less sympathy from their peers and from the public due to their physical beauty. 96
Observers “may or may not be moved by a claim that can be restated as ‘Don’t hate me because
I’m beautiful.’” 97 In this respect, attractive employees may see the negative consequences of
their physical appearance as eventually outweighing the benefits that their appearance can
produce.
II.

ANOTHER PATH? HOW NELSON AND OTHER “ATTRACTIVE
EMPLOYEES” MIGHT PREVAIL IN SIMILAR CASES

Cases like Nelson thus present quite a puzzle: If countless studies establish that attractive
employees enjoy significant advantages at work, 98 how can Nelson and her counterparts claim
that their attractive looks somehow undermined their jobs? While Nelson’s straightforward
theory of gender discrimination – her theory that she “did not do anything to get herself fired
except exist as a female” 99 – did not lead to victory, there are other paths that she (and others like
her) might successfully pursue if they believe that they were fired as a result of their good looks.
A.

The Missing Harassment Claim as One Possible Route to Future Success

One obvious route that was available to Ms. Nelson – yet one that she elected not to
pursue – was a sexual harassment claim against Dr. Knight. Knight’s behavior seemed to
provide ample ammunition for a viable sexual harassment claim. As discussed above, he
engaged in explicit, seemingly one-sided sexual banter with Nelson, making suggestive
comments regarding her clothing and her sex life, and describing to Nelson in graphic terms the
extent to which she made him feel sexually aroused. 100 Yet despite this evidence, Nelson’s
counsel chose not to pursue a harassment theory, sticking only to a theory of gender
discrimination. 101 This failure to allege harassment allowed the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly
to characterize the relationship between Knight and Nelson as “consensual” in nature, 102 and led
the court specifically to observe that the lack of a harassment claim limited its decision in this
case. 103 From this perspective, Nelson’s loss may appear more as an example of a missed
opportunity by her attorney than as a misinterpretation of the law by the court.
To prevail in a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff generally must show that she either
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter the terms and conditions of employment, or that she suffered some “tangible employment
96
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action” (i.e., a termination, demotion, etc.) as a result of her failure to submit to a superior’s
sexual demands. 104 Here, much of Dr. Knight’s undisputed conduct seems to provide an ample
basis for both types of sexual harassment: Nelson either could argue that Knight’s sexually
explicit texts and comments created a hostile work environment, or she could claim that,
regardless of whatever atmosphere his comments created, her termination resulted from her
rebuff of his overtures. 105 Yet Nelson never alleged, in either her formal court filings or any
press statements, that Dr. Knight’s conduct constituted sexual harassment. 106
So why did Nelson refrain from bringing this claim? As the court repeatedly noted,
Nelson never objected to Knight’s overtures, and apparently viewed her close and personal
relationship with Knight as consensual in nature. 107 Nelson’s own attorney stated that Nelson
declined to bring a harassment claim “because Knight’s conduct might not have risen to that
level and didn’t particularly offend [Nelson].” 108 While Nelson felt “shocked” and “betrayed”
by Knight’s conduct, she chalked these exchanges up to “social[] awkward[ness]” on Knight’s
part, as opposed to harassment. 109 Moreover, while Knight adopted the role of the initiator of
these sex-fueled communications, with Nelson maintaining a more passive role – receiving his
graphic overtures but apparently never responding with any sexual comments of her own 110 – she
never took any steps to terminate these communications (including the most obvious, asking
Knight to stop). 111
Of course, even Nelson’s “consent” to these conversations (or, at a minimum, her failure
explicitly to object) should not necessarily have stymied a harassment claim. Where, as here,
there is a significant power differential between the parties in a relationship, courts may be
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skeptical of the “consensual” nature of that relationship. 112 At least one court has recognized
that a plaintiff reasonably may refrain from telling a supervisor that his sexual comments are
unwelcome if he or she fears that objecting might cost the plaintiff his/her job, citing the
“disparity of power between a lower-level… employee and the owner of the business.” 113
Indeed, in rendering his concurring opinion in this case, the Chief Justice acknowledged that a
“personal relationship between an employer and subordinate can give rise to subtle issues of
power and control that may make the line between consensual and submissive relationships
difficult to draw.” 114 In this case, however, the Chief Justice noted that “Nelson made no legal
or factual claim that a relationship with Dr. Knight was submissive, objectionable, or harassing
in any way, and there was no evidence in the record to hint the relationship was not jointly
pursued.” 115
While Nelson elected not to pursue a sexual harassment claim in this case, other plaintiffs
alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance perhaps would have a basis
for asserting this theory as part of a wrongful termination claim. As the Nelson court observed,
the consensual nature of Knight and Nelson’s sexually charged (but unconsummated)
relationship was rather unusual. 116 In many cases, the comments directed toward a plaintiff who
claims to have been “too attractive” for a workplace likely will involve the sort of graphic and/or
sexually charged language that can support a claim of sexual harassment. 117 Moreover, most
employees receiving such sexually graphic communications from an employer likely would
object to such comments – either explicitly at the time or, at least, by later arguing that a
112
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subordinate position in the workplace prevented her from raising such contemporaneous
objections. 118 Thus, even if other plaintiffs similarly situated to Nelson might not prevail in
alleging gender discrimination based upon an employer firing them due to their (attractive)
physical appearance, most likely would have a strong basis for characterizing their termination
and/or any other adverse action as an example of unlawful sexual harassment.
B.

The Attractive Employee as a Victim of Gender Stereotyping: Applying
Price Waterhouse to the “Too Hot” Employee

While some plaintiffs similarly-situated to Nelson might find success simply by adding
an allegation of sexual harassment to their Complaints, others may also wish to pursue gender
discrimination claims separate from any allegations of harassment. Success also might be
possible for this group of plaintiffs, under an interpretation of antidiscrimination law that deals
with “sex stereotyping” at work.
Until the late 1980’s, the courts interpreted “sex discrimination” under Title VII 119 in a
fairly straightforward manner, construing the term “sex” in Title VII to apply only to anatomical
sex, and not to gender (i.e., whether someone demonstrates qualities that society deems
masculine or feminine). 120 In 1989, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 121 finding for the very first time that sex stereotyping
in the workplace was a prohibited form of sex discrimination. 122
The circumstances under which Price Waterhouse arose present an interesting contrast to
Nelson. Ann Hopkins had been serving as a Senior Manager in an office of Price Waterhouse,
the accounting firm, when she was proposed for partnership in 1982. 123 During the firm’s
consideration of her partnership, Hopkins’ colleagues praised her character and her many
professional accomplishments, 124 while simultaneously criticizing some of her personality
traits. 125 For example, some partners expressed concern about Hopkins’ “aggressiveness” and
“abrasiveness” when dealing with staff. 126 One partner described Hopkins as “macho,” and
another suggested that she “overcompensated for being a woman.” 127 Hopkins was told that she
should “take a course as charm school,” 128 and was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” 129
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Hopkins ultimately was denied partnership, 130 she sued for gender discrimination under Title
VII. 131
In finding Price Waterhouse liable for violating Title VII in this case, the Supreme Court
emphasized that, while employers retain broad latitude in making their employment decisions,
such decisions cannot be made on the basis of gender. 132 In cases where gender seems to play
some role in a decision – perhaps in conjunction with other characteristics, unrelated to gender –
an employer must be able to show that gender was not a motivating factor (i.e., that it would
have made the same decision anyway, even if it had not taken gender into account). 133 More
importantly, the Court held that employers who make employment decisions on the basis of sexbased stereotypes inherently are engaging in gender discrimination. 134 The Court stated that
“[w]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group…,” 135 noting that “an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender.” 136 In other words, by basing its decisions regarding Hopkins’ potential
partnership on assumptions about how a woman should behave at work – and by denying
Hopkins partnership for not complying with these assumptions – Price Waterhouse had engaged
in gender discrimination. 137
This theory of “sex stereotyping” gender discrimination has direct application to cases
like Nelson, and could provide a possible route to success for other plaintiffs who claim to have
received adverse treatment due to their attractive appearance. 138 Just as Hopkins claimed to have
suffered adverse treatment for not matching her colleagues’ expectations of a woman
(essentially, for not being “feminine enough”), 139 Nelson could have argued that she suffered
from a similar failure to meet expectations as to how a female should look and behave, in that
she claimed that she was too sexy and feminine for her workplace – at least according to her
employer. 140 From the way that she dressed to her willingness to tolerate (or perhaps engage in)
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sexual discussions with Dr. Knight, Nelson could argue that she fell outside of the expected
norm for a woman at work. 141
Tellingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court seemed to recognize the potential for this type of
claim in Nelson. The court explicitly discussed the gender stereotyping framework established
by Price Waterhouse, stating that “[i]f Nelson could show that she had been terminated because
she did not conform to a particular stereotype, this might be a different case.” 142 While Nelson
failed to provide evidence to support this theory, 143 others who claim to have suffered adverse
action due to their attractive physical appearance might be able to gather sufficient evidence to
show that by violating gender norms regarding how female employees should dress and act at
work, they ventured outside of the “cabined view of the proper behavior for women” that their
employers imposed in the workplace. 144
Moreover, even under the theory that Nelson was terminated not for her appearance, but
rather due to the jealousy-inducing relationship that she had with her boss, Nelson still perhaps
could have supported a stereotyping theory of gender discrimination. Perhaps the “norm” that
Nelson failed to satisfy here was not simply a failure to dress in the manner in which the Knights
believed a working woman should dress, or appear in the manner in which the Knights believed
a working woman should appear; perhaps the norm at issue involved Nelson’s behavior – her
failure to behave in the manner in which Mrs. Knight thought a working woman should behave.
To the extent that one might not expect a married woman to form a close, personal relationship
with a male coworker or boss, 145 the jealousy-inducing “relationship” that the formed the basis
for Nelson’s termination could be seen as its own violation of gender expectations. Although the
court largely ignored this theory in its opinion, there is at least some evidence to support this
analysis: The court noted that Mrs. Knight had deemed it “strange that after being at work all
day and away from her kids and husband that [Nelson] would not be anxious to get home like the
other [women] in the office.” 146 While the court acknowledged that “[v]iewed in isolation, this
statement could be an example of a gender-based stereotype,” 147 it gave this argument only
cursory attention, quickly concluding that, in the broader context of other statements made by
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Mrs. Knight, this statement instead simply evidenced Mrs. Knight’s (non-stereotype-based)
concerns about Nelson’s relationship with Dr. Knight. 148
While Nelson did not succeed in providing support for this type of gender stereotyping
sex discrimination claim, other plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive
physical appearance might have more success with this theory. Indeed, even a cursory
examination of the facts in other situations where employees have alleged adverse treatment due
to their beauty indicates that this theory might play out differently in other cases: In the
Willingham case, for example – where the plaintiff was terminated after she appeared as “Ms.
Cruzin’ South August 2008,” as well as in sexually suggestive photos in another publication) 149
– Ms. Willingham specifically alleged that “her physical appearance in a non-work related
magazine did not comport with [the employer’s] preferred feminine stereotype which… required
her to dress or appear ‘conservatively’ at all times.” 150 The court, however, rejected this
argument, finding that the out-of-work nature of the conduct here rendered a Price Waterhouse
argument inapplicable here. 151 Concerns about gender stereotypes likewise could be seen
underlying the claims of Debrahlee Lorenzana, the Citibank banker who claimed to have been
fired because her figure and clothes were “too distracting” to her male colleagues. 152
Presumably, had Lorenzana fit the mold of the typical banker – conservative, expensively but
modestly attired 153 – her male colleagues would not have noticed and/or been distracted by her
appearance. 154
Notably, to bring this type of sex stereotyping claim, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that
the defendant harbored hostility toward the protected group. 155 In other words, neither Nelson
nor any other plaintiff would have to show that their employer demonstrated ill will toward
women in general. 156 Rather, these employees only would have to show that men and women
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intentionally were treated differently in the workplace, even when the stereotypes underlying this
treatment were benign. 157
At the same time, however, these cases involving gender stereotyping expose the “double
bind” that many women face in the workplace. 158 They must be “feminine enough” to satisfy
their employers’ expectations regarding how a woman should appear and behave at work, 159 but
not so overtly sexual and overly feminine so as to distract their fellow employees. 160 For
Hopkins, this created an obvious catch 22: She needed to be aggressive and forceful to excel in
her job, but was denied the pinnacle of recognition for workplace success (i.e., partnership)
precisely because she exhibited these traits. 161
Admittedly, for other female employees, this argument plays out somewhat differently
than it would have in Hopkins. Unlike Hopkins – who was required to be assertive in order to
make partner, then penalized for meeting this expectation – the female plaintiffs in cases like
Nelson, Willingham, or Lorenzana are not being asked to mute characteristics that are essential to
performing or excelling in their job duties. These women did not hold positions (dental assistant,
banks) in which the attribute for which they purportedly were penalized – their physical
attractiveness – enhanced their performance in any obvious way. Yet despite this distinction,
even plaintiffs in these “too hot” cases may be able to draw upon the underlying tenets of Price
Waterhouse to argue that they suffered gender discrimination due to the application of sex
stereotypes.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN MISREPRESENTING THESE CASES: THE
QUEST TO MAINTAIN THE “MADONNA-WHORE” PARADIGM

Despite the possible routes to success may have existed for Nelson – from her neglected
sexual harassment claim to a possible “gender stereotyping” claim – Nelson ultimately failed to
prevail in her claim against Knight. 162 Given the salacious facts in this case, 163 some amount of
media attention (and, perhaps, some critiquing of the result) was to be expected. In the wake of
the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision, however, the media unleashed an onslaught of
condemnation toward this decision, eviscerating the court’s conclusion in this case. From small,
local outlets to national news organizations, the media almost uniformly described this case in
simple (and often inaccurate) terms – as one involving a woman who had been fired solely based
upon her appearance, and involving an all-male court with no concept of women’s rights,
without addressing the complicated relational circumstances that underlay this case or the
precedent that actually controlled the court’s decision.
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A.

Snapshot of a Hyperbolic Media

The reporting in the wake of the Nelson decision – both following the initial, December
2012 decision and the subsequent July 2013 decision – abounded with examples of the media
presenting this decision in simplistic, hyperbolic and often flatly incorrect terms. Shortly
following the court’s initial decision in this case, Business Insider headlined its coverage,
“‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired for Being Too Sexy,” 164 reporting that “[a]n ‘irresistible’ Iowa
dental assistant fired for threatening her boss’s marriage – even though she turned away his
advances – has lost her discrimination lawsuit.” 165 (This, even though nothing in the record
indicates that Nelson ever “turned away” Knight’s advances, and even though Nelson’s failure to
bring a harassment claim seems to contradict such a characterization of her stance toward her
boss. 166)
A CNN story following the court’s second decision described this case as one in which a
woman was “[f]ired because a man can’t control himself,” 167 blasting the “all-male Iowa
Supreme Court” for allegedly holding “that men are so controlled by their gonads that they can
fire an employee at will for being able to incite attraction, sex, love, whatever,” 168 and for
finding that “[n]o matter that she is going about her job or being a stellar employee; if she’s got a
cute butt or a nicely turned nose, her job is history.” 169 According to the CNN commentator,
“the Iowa Supreme Court guys… saw the issue, at least in part, as protecting the institution of
marriage rather than an infringement on a woman’s right to work.” 170 Nowhere did this story
mention that the Iowa court was relying upon precedent, which previously had held that an
employer does not engage in gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is
involved in a consensual personal relationship that has triggered personal jealousy. 171 Nowhere
did the story mention the extent to which the Iowa court’s decision rested on the consensual
nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson. 172 Nowhere did this reporter explain the
limited nature of the court’s decision – the fact that the court repeatedly had noted Nelson’s
failure to bring a sexual harassment claim or otherwise to characterize Knight’s conduct as
“unwelcome.” 173
And then, there was the New York Times editorial that seemed to set the bar for
sensationalizing the Iowa court’s decision. In a piece entitled Fired for Being Beautiful, the
writer joined the media chorus in slamming the Iowa court’s decision. 174 The author compared
the Iowa Justices to Islamic fundamentalists, observing, “[y]es, like some Midwestern Taliban
tribunal, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted a male boss to fire anyone who might conceivably
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tempt him. Mullah Omar would approve.” 175 The writer went on to suggest that “[m]aybe… the
Iowa Supreme Court should require all beautiful women to wear burquas,” opining that “[w]ith
Ms. Nelson completely covered, Mr. Knight could pay full attention to his patients’ dental
concerns – while ignoring the ethical cavity that mars discrimination law in Iowa.” 176 Once
again, nowhere in the article did the author mention the unusual factual circumstances under
which this case arose. Nowhere in his evisceration of Dr. Knight – with “his willpower so limp,
his commitment to his wife so weak, that he must be shielded from the hot and the beautiful” 177
– did the writer note the apparently consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and
Nelson, nor the significant role that this relationship played in leading the court to its decision.
Local outlets likewise played a role in simplifying and hyperbolizing the results in this
case, particularly in editorials and other opinion pieces. In the wake of the Iowa Supreme
Court’s initial decision, one local editorial identified Knight’s attraction to Nelson and fear that
he might act unprofessionally toward her “the lone reason” for Nelson’s termination. 178 While
the editorial mentioned prior precedent that “upheld an employer’s right to fire for relationships
that cause jealousy and tension within a business owner’s family,” 179 the editorial again failed to
note the limited nature of the court’s decision, with its emphasis on the consensual nature of the
relationship between Knight and Nelson. 180 Another editorial more explicitly argued both sides
of the issue: While the piece acknowledged that finding in Nelson’s favor would “force[] an
employer in [Knight’s] situation to keep an employee whose continued employment could lead
to a sexual-harassment lawsuit, a divorce or both,” 181 its headline trumpeted that “Iowa law
allows men to be jerks.” 182 Yet another editorial instructed its readers, “[t]hat’s right ladies. If
the boss finds you too hot, you can be fired,” 183 neglecting to inform readers of the full, more
nuanced scope of the court’s decision – that if your boss “finds you too hot,” and you engage in a
consensual relationship with him that causes jealousy, and you fail ever to allege that his
comments about your “hotness” were unwelcome or harassing… you can be fired. This local
criticism continued in the wake of the court’s second opinion in this case. A piece tellingly titled
“… Court backs lusty boss over the innocent employee” described this case in similarly
simplistic terms, electing simply to blast the court’s “adolescent rationale” and “idiotic
conclusion” instead of explaining the nuances of this decision to its readers. 184
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To be sure, in all of these cases, there was a sizable kernel of truth in the media’s
reporting: To the extent that the stories portrayed this case as one where an employer was
permitted to terminate Ms. Nelson because her physical attractiveness led to a consensual
relationship with her employer, and such relationship rendered her a threat to her employer’s
marriage (at least, in her employer’s wife’s view), these reporters correctly portrayed at least part
of the story. But virtually none of the stories reporting this decision provided the proper context
for this case – explaining the Iowa precedent that exempts from discrimination liability
terminations resulting from consensual personal relationships that cause jealously, or noting the
extent to which the outcome here rested upon a very narrow set of facts, in which the terminated
employee specifically declined to allege that her employer’s conduct and comments were
unwelcome or harassing. While it may have made for better news to portray the justices of the
Iowa Supreme Court as a rogue group of misogynistic bigots, a more accurate report regarding
this case would have included these less sensationalistic – but legally significant – facts.
Interestingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court itself may have sensed the potential for the
media and the public to misunderstand the nature of this case. As noted above, 185 the Iowa
Supreme Court issued two decisions in this case – first issuing a unanimous opinion granting
summary judgment to Dr. Knight on December 21, 2012, 186 and later substituting a second
opinion in July 2013 (and doing so without having any new evidence presented to the court and
without any additional oral argument). 187 While this second opinion again affirmed summary
judgment for Dr. Knight, 188 it differed from the court’s initial opinion in some significant
respects. First, while all of the Justices had signed onto the court’s December 2012 opinion, 189
this July opinion included a lengthy Concurrence authored by the Chief Justice of the court. 190
This Concurring opinion contained a more extensive explanation of the “basis and rationale” for
the court’s decision than that which had been issued previously. 191 Among other points, the
Chief Justice emphasized that Nelson had stated a claim for sex discrimination (or, perhaps,
several possible claims for sex discrimination) under Iowa law, 192 arguing that she simply had
failed to articulate sufficient facts to support her claim, 193 particularly in light of the consensual
nature of her relationship with Dr. Knight. 194 Withdrawing a unanimous opinion only to
substitute another that reaches the same result (simply with somewhat more extensive analysis),
likely is not a common action for an already overburdened court. Indeed, issuing such an
because of her gender,” id., and cited the Justices’ view that “Nelson was fired because of her behavior, not her
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opinion without seeking additional briefing from the parties or additional oral argument seems
even more unusual. 195 Perhaps, faced with such tremendous – and possibly unexpected – media
backlash in the wake of the court’s initial decision, the Justices felt compelled to clarify their
reasoning. 196
The court’s second opinion also framed the key question faced by the court in a manner
that differed from the first opinion in a significant way: In its initial, December 2012 opinion,
the court framed the question that it faced as “whether an employee who has not engaged in
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss views the employee as an
irresistible attraction.”197 In its July 2013 opinion, the court framed the question somewhat
differently, asking “whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be
lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss
and the employee as a threat to her marriage.” 198 In this way, the court shifted its focus from
looking at Knight’s conduct – his potential inability to resist a sexual relationship with Nelson –
to a focus on the relationship between Knight and Nelson. The former framing of the question
opens the door to the type of subjective analysis and gender warfare characterizations that
emerged in many of the media stories regarding this case, making it easy for reporters and other
commentators to blast Dr. Knight for his uncontrollable lust and weak will-power. 199 Indeed,
many of the articles that came out in the wake of this initial decision seized on the “irresistible”
language in the opinion as a way of framing this case. 200 How does one find a legal or factual
basis for determining whether an employee is sufficiently “irresistible” to justify her termination
(assuming that such “irresistible-ness” ever can serve as a justification for termination)? In
contrast, by framing the question before the court in terms of the consensual relationship
between Nelson and Dr. Knight, the court not only could provide a stronger factual basis for its
decision given the wealth of evidence regarding this relationship, 201 but also could tie its
decision to relevant precedent – precedent that previously had held that terminations related to
consensual relationships which cause jealousy do not violate Title VII. 202 This revised framing
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of the question thus may have allowed the court to provide a stronger legal and factual basis for
its decision – and perhaps one that would seem more palatable to the public. 203
B.

Sexiness Sells: The Media’s Sensationalism Bias

So given the legal and factual basis for the ultimate result in this case, why did many in
the media still get the Nelson case so wrong, even after the court issued its second decision?
What led the media to ignore the complicated and nuanced background to this case and instead
report this dispute as one simply involving a woman allegedly fired for being “too hot” for her
employer? The answer lies in more fundamental flaws in the media’s method of reporting issues
– and particularly in reporting on legal issues.
While inaccurate or otherwise skewed reporting by the media inevitably provides some
cause for concern, the notion that the media gets things wrong likely is not shocking to the
average observer of the news. Indeed, the media seems to make errors all the time –
oversimplifying complex issues, exaggerating events, and sensationalizing stories at every
opportunity. 204 As one commentator observed, the “[m]ass media will oversimplify and dumb
down discussions of public issues, substitute sensationalism and amusement for deliberation
about public questions, and transform news and politics into forms of entertainment and
spectacle.” 205 Far from the ideal of serious reporting on important issues, the media has evolved
into an amalgamation of “newszak, bonk journalism, infotainment, or simply tabloid news.” 206
Yet while it may be accepted wisdom that the media generally prioritizes entertainment
over information, this misplacement of reporting priorities seems particularly problematic in the
context of legal reporting – in stories focusing on the criminal or civil liability or individuals or
corporations. In an empirical project that surveyed the views of general counsels working at S &
P 500 companies, law firm partners, and public relations executives, the media’s failure
accurately to report on legal issues represented one significant concern (among many others) of
those responding, as many lawyer interviewees complained that the media “tends to oversimplify
complex issues and get the facts and details wrong.” 207 As one participant noted, “[the media]
want for me to get down to the sound bite, and I wanna push back and say, “It’s not a sound
bite.” 208
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The U.S. Supreme Court itself has decried the extent to which the media misrepresents
and distorts outcomes in matters of law. For example, shortly after Justice Alito joined the
Court, he noted in a speech that “the news media typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes.” 209
Justice Ginsburg has expressed similar concerns, arguing that the press often overinterprets
unimportant actions, inappropriately forecasts outcomes, and overstates the significance of
certiorari denials. 210 The headlines chosen by the press, according to Ginsburg, are “more eyecatching than significant.” 211 Equally vociferous in his criticism of the media, Justice Scalia has
observed that “[t]he press is never going to report judicial opinions accurately… They’re just
going to report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice old lady? And who is the defendant? Was
this, you know, some skuzzy guy? And who won? Was it the good guy that won or the bad
guy?” 212 Such complaints about the media may seem mundane – even when lobbed by the
highest judicial officers in the land. But why is the public so complacent about a media that
exaggerates, spins, flattens and misleads? Particularly when the media reports on stories of legal
significance, perhaps this failure to “get it right” should be greater cause for alarm.
C.

Bias on Steroids: The Need for a Script in Stories Involving Women

While the media’s tendency simultaneously to hyperbolize and oversimplify legal stories
hardly comes as a surprise, this inability to present the news in an accurate and unbiased manner
is even more pronounced in stories involving female protagonists. News stories about women
invariably focus in their physical appearance to a far greater degree than stories about their male
counterparts. 213 According to one scholar, “many newspaper editors seem incapable of printing
a story featuring a woman without some evaluation of her attractiveness, or at least a description
of her age and her hair colour.” 214 Men, in contrast, rarely are described in terms of their
physical appearance – and on those rare occasions when a man’s appearance does make its way
into a news story, it generally is reported in a more objective, “meta-level” manner (such as by
discussing the phenomenon of a male star’s sex symbol status, as opposed to the star’s physical
appearance itself). 215
More disturbing is the manner in which female appearance makes its way into these
stories: Regardless of her identity or status, a woman in the news tends to be represented “in one
of two ways – in terms of her domestic role or her sexual attractiveness.” 216 In this vein, women
who fail to confirm to the media’s physical expectations find themselves subject to vilification

209

John Heilprin, Scalia Sees Shift in Court’s Role, WashingtonPost.com, Oct. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102200965.html.
210
Frank J. Murray, Ginsburg finds full court press lacking, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995.
211
Id.
212
See Heilprin, supra note 209. Justice Thomas has been even more direct in his vilification of the media,
publically referring to members of the media as “smart-aleck commentators,” “snot-nosed brat[s],” “talking heads
who shout at each other,” and “snotty nosed smirks.” Justice Thomas Complains nation ‘Awash In Cynicism,’
ChicagoTrubune.com, Sept. 15, 1998, available at, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-0915/news/9809150138_1_fight-cynicism-white-house-intern-monica-lewinsky.
213
See Gill, supra note 206, at 115-16.
214
Id. at 115.
215
See id. at 116.
216
Id. at 115.

and scorn. 217 From the media’s reporting on President Clinton’s relationship with Monica
Lewinsky (“a chorus of ‘ugh – how could he,’ rather than any political or ethical debate about
[the President’s behavior]”), 218 to the British press’s vicious attacking of Duchess Sarah
Ferguson’s (“Fergie’s”) appearance (with a telephone poll inviting male participants to rate
whether they would rather “date … Fergie or a goat”), 219 to attacks on actress Kate Winslet
following her appearance in the movie Titanic (printing diet plans for her follow and dubbing her
“Titanic Kate,” instead of focusing on the merits of her Oscar nominated performance), 220 this
focus on female physical appearance over substance seems to apply across subject matters.
Surprisingly, even well established women whose place in the public eye seemingly has
no link to their appearance find themselves judged by these same beauty standards. A study of
female parliamentarians in Britain, South Africa and Australia revealed numerous examples of a
media fixated on the appearance of these female politicians, 221 with at least one respondent
commenting that “[w]omen are never the right age. We are too young, we’re too old. We are too
thin, we’re too fat. We wear too much makeup, we don’t wear enough. We are too flashy in our
dress, we don’t take enough care. There isn’t a thing we can do that is right.” 222 Closer to home,
former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton received similar, appearance-focused coverage both
during and after her run for the White House. On the presidential campaign trail, Clinton’s
appearance “was a common topic of conversation” in coverage of her campaign, 223 with
observers commenting on everything from the color of her suit to her latest hairstyle. 224 Even
one of Clinton’s male rivals on the campaign trial, former Senator Fred Thompson, noted the
different standard to which Clinton was held, sympathizing that “Clinton has to look matronly
without looking beautiful, tough without looking harsh.” 225 During her tenure as Secretary of
State, Clinton’s decision to appear wearing glasses (as opposed to contact lenses) and with no
cosmetics other than lipstick drew national attention, along with a front-and-center place on the
well-known Drudge Report. 226 While some in the media expressed outrage that Clinton’s
appearance without makeup might qualify as “news,” others defended Clinton’s appearance in
these same gendered terms – arguing that she looked “fresh-faced” in the pictures, that she
looked “good” in the photos. 227 Rather than focus on the content of the visit during which these
photos were taken – a diplomatic stop in Bangladesh – these stories continued a pattern of
characterizing a woman in the news according to her appearance.
217
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Despite working in a profession in which physical appearance seems to lack any
relevance, even women in the military find themselves confronted by a “beauty bias” – albeit,
perhaps in a manner somewhat different from that faced by other women in the news. One
female solder recently found herself receiving the brunt of a female superior’s ire after her photo
appeared in a military publication showing her “wearing carefully applied eyeliner and lip
gloss.” 228 According to the superior officer, the photo “undermine[d] the rest of the message
[about gender parity in combat] (and may even make people ask if breaking a nail is considered
hazardous duty).” 229 In this officer’s view – and contrary to the conventional wisdom (in which
those who satisfy societal standards of physical beauty find themselves with many advantages as
compared to other “less attractive” peers) 230 – “ugly women are perceived as competent while
pretty women are perceived as having used their looks to get ahead.” 231 Thus, to a great degree,
the women portrayed in these stories find themselves in a no-win situation: Women who are not
sufficiently physically attractive face an onslaught of criticism and belittlement, 232 but those who
seem “too beautiful” may find themselves stereotyped and written off in other ways. 233 In the
words of one commentator, “[y]ou have to be beautiful to matter, but beauty can and will be used
against you.” 234
These no-win restrictions that women face with respect to their appearance actually
extend much further than skin deep. In creating a dichotomy for portraying women in the news,
the media not only seems focused on their subjects’ physical beauty, but also often amplifies
appearance into behavior: Women not only must fit into a particular “box” with respect to the
way that they look, but also must fall into a predetermined role related to their sexuality (or lack
thereof). Here too, women fall into one of two roles – either that of the Madonna (pure and
pristine with sexuality muted), or that of the whore (sexually promiscuous and often vilified). 235
From popular music, 236 to literature, 237 to movies, 238 to children’s animated films, 239 women are
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portrayed as either virtuous and pure or as desire-driven and cunning, with virtually no room for
any grey area in between.
This crabbed view regarding how women are portrayed in public extends beyond
fictional depictions in books, movies and the like. Indeed, “real” women portrayed in the news
may find themselves shoved into this same storyline. Few events in recent media history
illustrate the Madonna/Whore dichotomy faced by women in the news more than the late 1980’s
sex scandal involving televangelist Jim Bakker and former church secretary Jessica Hahn. 240
In December 1980, renowned televangelist Jim Bakker, head of the Praise the Lord
(PTL) Ministries, had a sexual encounter with former church secretary Jessica Hahn in a Florida
hotel room. 241 When news of their encounter became public in 1987, Bakker and Hahn each told
different stories about what had happened during this encounter. According to the initial version
of the story (the version told both by Hahn and by the national press), Hahn had been a modest,
20-year old woman who initially cleaned toilets at church, eventually became the church’s
secretary, and who had exhibited total devotion to her job, including praying by phone with those
in need. 242 Despite her physical attractiveness, Hahn had been only been on a handful of
dates. 243 Her sex education had come from library books as opposed to life experience, and she
had vowed to remain a virgin until marriage. 244
In the immediate wake of the scandal, when Hahn’s relationship with Bakker first
became public, Hahn’s portrayal in the media epitomized the innocent Madonna: She was
depicted as the “ruined-innocent, good-girl character… weeping after a phone call to her
parents… reading the Bible… demure and unprepossessing.” 245 She claimed never to have
wanted money from Bakker as a result of this encounter (despite eventually collecting a
settlement of $265,000 from his church), but rather claimed only to have wanted an opportunity
to vent her grievances and perhaps receive an apology from Bakker. 246
Hahn’s reprieve in the media limelight, however, proved to be short lived. The media
soon was reporting on the large financial settlement that Hahn had received, implying that “good
girls, even if they do actually have sex, and even if they’re forced to, don’t get paid for it….” 247
The press mentioned her “shiny lipstick and Porsche sunglasses, her boots, tight jeans and tight
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sweaters.” 248 Eventually, after the million-dollar payout for her appearance in Playboy became
public, the media and its consumers quickly abandoned any allegiance with or sympathy for
Hahn. 249 In the eyes of both the media and the public at large, Hahn became just another “loose
woman,” a seductress, willing to sell her chastity to the highest bidder. 250 Indeed, in the words
of one observer, “it[] [was] as though Hahn reached behind her head and slowly peeled off the
face of the virginal church secretary to reveal – gasp! – her evil, nymphomaniacal, come-andget-it twin.” 251
In many ways, Hahn’s transformation was typical. Indeed, this need to force Hahn into a
particular persona, victim or vamp, falls squarely within the media’s usual modus operandi. 252
As one commentator has observed, this dichotomy – this “axis of sexually ‘pure’ and sexually
‘ruined,’ of virgin or whore, of loose woman or bad girl…” – remains “one of the central axes
along which women’s positioning in the public sphere has run.” 253 Hahn’s ability to straddle
both stereotypes, to act as both “[g]ood girl and her evil twin, trusting, naïve ruined woman and
calculating, sex-drenched golddigger, victim and vamp…,” casts her as what some have called
“the best summary we have of the sex scandal icon.” 254
Yet while the media’s desire to characterize Hahn as fitting into one of two boxes might
not come as a surprise given the media’s tendency to oversimplify and typecast, the speed and
fierceness with which the media and the public turned on Hahn – rejecting her claims of
innocence and virginity and chastising her as a loose woman and media whore – does raise
questions. Almost from the moment that Hahn’s encounter with Bakker became public, one
sensed a media struggling with how to characterize her tale. Even the earliest descriptions of
Hahn “swing between the dog-loving, Bible-reading, small-town virgin and her alter-ego, the
big-haired, gum-chomping, knowing tease.” 255 From this perspective, it would not take much –
merely the slightest push in one direction or the other, toward Madonna or whore – to vault Hahn
more permanently into one of these two camps.
Admittedly, Hahn made it easy for members of the media to describe her in hyperbolic
terms. She provided ample fodder for the press to cast as either the “[p]ower hungry temptress
of powerful man (busty, licking her lips)…” 256 or the “chaste beauty ruined by powerful man
(young, smooth, eyes cast down but glancing up with hints of desire)”). 257 But why did she have
to be one or the other? Wasn’t it possible that Hahn, like most women, was a woman with a
complex personality and nuanced sexuality, and not simply a one-dimensional cartoon character?
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In shoving Hahn consecutively into these two boxes, first that of virgin, then that of whore, the
media oversimplified what likely was a much more complex tale.
In this way, the media’s portrayal of Hahn can provide insight into the flawed coverage
of Knight v. Nelson. Perhaps, just as the media seemed so eager to cement Hahn into a particular
mold, so too did they desire similarly to define Nelson – to characterize Nelson as either
“Madonna” or “whore.” Yet Nelson also did not fit cleanly into either of these categories. As a
(mostly) passive target of Dr. Knight’s amorous proclamations – the mere recipient of his
explicit communications 258 – Nelson hardly could be characterized as a whore. Knight, and not
Nelson, seemed both to initiate and foster their inappropriate relationship. 259 At the same time,
however, Nelson’s behavior seemed not quite virginal. As the Iowa court noted repeatedly in its
opinion, Nelson not only never objected to Knight’s overtures, she also apparently did not even
deem them harassing in nature. 260 Perhaps the court believed that a “true” virgin would have
responded less passively to such graphic statements from a man other than her husband or
partner. 261
Thus, faced with a protagonist who could not fit squarely into a predetermined role, the
media found itself faced with a choice regarding how it wanted to characterize Nelson in this
story – and it chose the Madonna persona. Whether driven by an inherent sympathy for the
underdog plaintiff, 262 by a desire to tell a more sensational story, 263 or by other forces altogether,
the media by and large opted to portray this case as one in which a (largely) innocent employee
“suffered because Knight couldn’t control his libido…” 264 (Indeed, at least one editorial framed
this case in precisely those terms, titling a piece “Court backs the lusty boss over the innocent
employee.”) 265 Yet by forcing Nelson into a cloak that didn’t quite fit, the media inevitably
skewed its coverage of her story. It couldn’t report on Nelson’s passivity in the face of Knight’s
graphic overtures without tarnishing Nelson’s pure and pristine appearance. It couldn’t describe
the legal nuance in the Iowa court’s decision – the precedent permitting terminations based on
relationships that create jealousy, 266 or the court’s surprise at Nelson’s failure to allege sexual
harassment, 267 or the limited scope of the opinion itself 268 – without weakening the power of the
broader narrative. Better to portray a simple tale of a female employee twice wronged – first by
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her lust-ridden employer and then by an out-of-touch, misogynistic court – than to convey the
true complexities that underlay this case.
D.

A Perfect Storm: Media Sensationalism + Gender Stereotyping Leads to
Skewed Reporting in Gender Discrimination Cases

While the Nelson case provides one insight into how the media’s need to oversimplify
and stereotype female protagonists leads to skewed reporting and misinformation, this case sadly
represents but one example of a much broader trend. In fact, the media’s need to place female
protagonists in a particular box (either pure and pristine or sexually promiscuous), combined
with the media’s general tendency to sensationalize and oversimplify, may lead to skewed
reporting in a whole class of stories – those involving gender discrimination claims brought by
female plaintiffs.
In their 2004 study of print media accounts of employment discrimination cases from
1990 to 2000, Laura Beth Nielson and Aaron Beim found that the print media depicts
employment discrimination plaintiffs in a significantly more favorable light than reality
warrants. 269 These researchers found that the manner in which the media portrays outcomes in
gender discrimination cases vastly misrepresents reality in a manner highly favorable to
discrimination plaintiffs. 270 Specifically, among other misrepresentations, these researchers
found that the media depicts higher “win rates” and higher award amounts for plaintiffs in these
suits than actually is the case in federal court outcomes. 271
Neilsen and Beim found that during the period relevant to their study, plaintiffs were
portrayed in the media as having prevailed in 85% of all adjudicated cases (meaning that in those
media stories that specified a winner, plaintiffs prevailed 85% of the time). 272 The actual “win
rate” for plaintiffs in district court during this period, however, was 32% – less than half of that
reflected in media accounts. 273 When the study focused specifically on media coverage of jury
trials (a sample which itself is skewed with respect to outcomes, given the large number of cases
that settle), the media reported plaintiff victories in 98% of the trials covered, as compared to an
“actual” win rate of 41% for jury trial plaintiffs. 274 Media reports of discrimination cases tried as
bench trials similarly depicted prevailing plaintiffs in 68% of all reports of concluded cases, as
compared to an actual win rate of 20% for discrimination plaintiffs who opt for a bench trial. 275
Neilsen and Beim also found that the media inflated the size of awards in employment
discrimination cases during this period: In stories regarding jury trials, the median jury award
reported was $1,100,000. 276 The actual median jury award in discrimination cases during this
period was less than 7 times this amount – $150,000. 277
269
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As the authors of this study concluded, “[t]hese data demonstrate dramatic differences
between media accounts of employment discrimination cases and the actual dynamics and
outcomes of litigation.” 278 The authors worried that “[b]y portraying employment discrimination
lawsuits as those in which plaintiffs consistently and uniformly prevail, the media may be
contributing to its readership’s formation of an expectation of an outcome that is rarely met.” 279
Admittedly, Neilsen and Beim’s focus was on discrimination cases generally, as opposed to
solely on cases involving gender discrimination. 280 Yet statistics indicate that gender
discrimination claims consistently have made up a significant portion of all charges filed with the
EEOC – comprising roughly one-third of all charges filed with the agency between 1992 and
2013. 281 While there admittedly is a difference between charges merely filed with the EEOC and
cases that eventually their way into district court (i.e., the latter being the basis of Neilsen and
Beim’s analysis), there is no reason to believe that gender discrimination charges settle or are
otherwise resolved at any greater or lesser rate than other types of charges. Thus, one can assume
that Neilsen and Beim’s findings regarding misrepresentations with respect to discrimination
claims generally will be similarly reflected in any data regarding gender claims specifically.
By carrying over this unrealistic expectation specifically into lawsuits involving gender
discrimination – cases in which women most frequently serve as plaintiffs 282 – the media not
only may be skewing the public’s understanding of these types of claims, but also, as discussed
below, altering expectations regarding the role of women in the workplace more generally.
Indeed, by portraying the vast majority of female plaintiffs in these cases as “innocent victims”
to an extent that belies reality, the media continues and exacerbates the stratification that women
already face in the workplace and beyond: “True” victims of gender discrimination must
comport with the image of the Madonna, pure and pristine, while those women who happen to
fall outside of this box may be treated more harshly and vilified.
IV.

HIGH STAKES ERRORS: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MEDIA BIAS IN
STORIES INVOLVING WORKPLACE GENDER DISCRIMINATION

As already noted, there is nothing shocking about the proposition that the media
misrepresents, hyperbolizes, sensationalizes and oversimplifies. While many may wish that the
media would do a better job – particularly when reporting on legal matters – the fact that these
general problems carry over into the legal context likely comes as no surprise to the average
consumer of the news. Indeed, the media’s very ability to skew the public’s understanding of
278
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women in the workplace, particularly when it comes claims of gender discrimination, flows out
of the fact that most lay individuals have quite limited knowledge of employment law. For
example, most individuals fail to appreciate the meaning of the “employment at will doctrine,”
which permits an employer to terminate a worker’s employment at any time, for any reason. 283
Thus, when members of the public hear stories about employees being treated unfairly, many
automatically assume that such conduct is illegal. 284
It is equally unsurprising to discover that the media often portrays female protagonists in
a manner that favors stereotype and caricature over complexity and precision. The
“Madonna”/”whore” labels encompass roles that have long-been associated with women both
inside and outside of the workplace. Whether the subject is a celebrity, a political figure, or any
ordinary citizen, the media defaults to descriptions grounded in a woman’s physical appearance
and/or sexuality. 285
So why should anyone care when these two phenomenon occur simultaneously? Why
should it matter when the media not only glosses over details or otherwise skews the facts in
legal stories involving female plaintiffs, but also when it does so by adhering to this
Madonna/whore dichotomy? These errors matter because of the broader impact they may have
on women, both within the workplace and beyond. By telling the “stories” about discrimination
cases in a way that not only is inaccurate, but that also perpetuates stereotypes regarding the role
of women, the media unwittingly may be altering how the broader public views women both in
and out of work. Moreover, this change in how the broader public understands the roles of
women may have several significant ramifications.
First, inaccuracies in the media regarding how women are portrayed (i.e., as Madonna or
whore; as physically desirable or useless), may impact the public’s priorities with respect to
policy and legislation. The media has a direct impact on how lay individuals understand the
law. 286 As one legal scholar has observed, “[m]uch of what Americans know, or only think they
know, about legal issues comes from media portrayals.” 287 The media impacts which issues their
audiences take seriously: By ignoring some problems and paying attention to others, the media
helps to shape the legal and policy priorities of the general public. 288 When the media
consistently repeats certain stories and frameworks, individuals come to understand the law
primarily through these frameworks – especially if the individuals are starting from a point of
relative naïveté and thus are less capable of challenging what they see. 289 Thus, if the story that
media consumers see again and again is one where female plaintiffs almost always prevail in
employment discrimination lawsuits, receiving enormous damage awards, and one in which
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these female plaintiffs must fit into a particular template with respect tot heir appearance and
sexuality, this may alter the lens through which employers, human resource professionals,
employees, and even judges and other policy makers view the workplace. 290 The workplace
becomes an arena not where discrimination claims are rare, and where such claims are evaluated
objectively according to the facts, but rather becomes akin to a battlefield, where employers must
remain on guard against unfounded claims by scheming vixens (as well as perhaps some
legitimate claims brought by truly victimized females) – both of which will cost the employer
dearly. An employer focused on maintaining this defensive crouch may prioritize guarding
against discrimination liability in an unnecessarily high position, overlooking other important
tasks key to running a successful business. 291
In addition to impacting the priorities that are set with respect to the relative importance
of “women’s issues,” these misrepresentations of women in the public eye also can have a
concrete impact on policies and practices in the business world. When the media paints a picture
in which discrimination plaintiffs overwhelmingly prevail, and then characterizes the female
plaintiffs who may initiate these cases as either innocent victims or conniving vamps, it fuels an
excessive fear among employers regarding employment discrimination lawsuits. 292 This
excessive fear, in turn, may have a direct impact on personnel decisions – who to hire and who to
fire. 293 Indeed, research has shown that human resource professionals often overestimate – and
thus overcompensate for – the risk of liability from employment-related litigation. 294 In some
cases, these perceived threats of liability might discourage employers from hiring women (or
members of other protected groups) out of fear regarding their potential exposure if adverse
action must be taken against such individuals down the road. 295 In other words, employers may
be less likely to hire women if they fear that a female employee who later is fired, or denied a
raise, or misses out on a promotion is likely not only to sue for gender discrimination, but also to
win (and to win a significant award). In this way, the skewed image of women presented by the
media may be having an impact on the composition of the workforce. 296
This increased fear of liability that many employers may have regarding having women
in the workplace also may be creating a market for certain types of liability insurance.
“Employment Practices Liability Insurance” (“EPLI”) provides employers with insurance against
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liability for employee claims of discriminatory or otherwise wrongful termination, among other
claims. 297 Thus, media accounts that tout victories by discrimination plaintiffs beyond those
reflected in reality, and/or those that publicize improbably substantial awards, may create an
artificial market for this expensive product. 298 This fear of liability also likely promotes job
security for the human resources staff within a company: Employers who believe that they are
merely one employment decision away from the receiving end of a risky and high-stakes
discrimination lawsuit are likely to feel a greater need to retain the human resources
professionals charged with guiding these decisions. 299
Finally, these media distortions both regarding the role of women in the workplace and
regarding their potential to prevail in discrimination lawsuits may have a substantial negative
impact on workplace morale. 300 Research indicates that workers who claim to have experienced
discrimination in the workplace often are viewed by colleagues as having themselves been at
fault – often are themselves viewed as “troublemakers.” 301 In the context of race discrimination
complaints, for example, workers who claim to have experienced adverse treatment due to their
race frequently are viewed as “making excuses” for their own workplace deficiencies or as trying
to use the legal system to grab an unearned cash award. 302 Notably, this type of negative
response toward complaining individuals has been found to occur even when clear evidence
indicated that the complaining individuals in fact had experienced discrimination. 303
Thus, a female employee who complains that she has experienced gender discrimination
due to her appearance not only may find herself shoved into a particular box – labeled as the
innocent victim or the conniving temptress – but also may herself be seen as creating this
problem, perhaps by dressing in a certain manner or devoting excessive time to honing her
feminine appearance. Indeed, Nelson and similar “too hot” cases support this “blame the
victim” mentality: The Nelson court noted a factual dispute regarding whether Nelson’s attire
actually was “too tight and revealing,” or whether it was appropriate, as Nelson alleged. 304
Media stories regarding terminated wholesale lingerie employee Lauren Odes raised similar
concerns, discussing whether her “simple tee-shirt and jeggings” had been deemed “too
distracting” for her employer. 305 In neither of these discussions did the court or the media assert
that Nelson or Odes’s choice of clothing was irrelevant to the discussion – that no matter what
attire each woman chose to wear, it would not justify adverse treatment from her employer. As
other employees (particularly female employees) observe this dynamic, in which a colleague
claims to have been penalized due to her gender and then is herself characterized as possibly
creating her own problems, they not only may hesitate before voicing their own concerns about
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adverse treatment at work, but also may question whether their physical appearance is
undermining their ability to succeed in their jobs.
CONCLUSION
While it is easy to downplay the role of the media in shaping public views – to write the
media off as no more than an infotainment-providing distraction – the media in fact plays a
substantial role in setting the agenda for public discourse, informing citizens of facts that will
shape their beliefs, and in promoting the policies and practices that employers, judges and
legislators may adopt. Thus, significant negative ramifications may arise when women in the
public eye are portrayed in a misleading or otherwise in accurate manner – when evaluations of
their physical attractiveness imbues articles in which appearance otherwise should play no role,
or when their sexuality is generalized into one of two roles, Madonna or whore. The Nelson case
presents a prime example of how easy it is for the media, through even minimal skewing of its
coverage, to alter drastically the way in which a story is portrayed, often resulting in misdirected
ire from the public at large.
To be sure, the actual decision in Nelson provided much to critique: One understandably
and reasonably could lament a decision that allows the jealousy of an employer’s spouse to
justify an employee’s termination (particularly when the employee played a lesser, more passive
role in fostering the relationship that led to the jealousy). One also could question whether the
court’s attempt to limit this case by placing so much emphasis on the “consensual” nature of the
relationship between Knight and Nelson accurately reflects the realities of most worksites, where
subordinate employees might hesitate before objecting to or deterring the advances of a boss or
other superior. Indeed, if carefully and accurately reported, a case like Nelson could open the
door to important, broader discussions: discussions about gender dynamics in the office and the
role of women in the workplace; discussions about how employers and employees properly
should navigate relationships that extend beyond the workplace; and discussions about the
stereotypes and standards that society unwittingly imposes on employees based upon their
gender. But by oversimplifying this case – by portraying this case as one simply about a lustfilled male employer and his blameless, pure female employee – the media obscured the
relevance of these other points. While many portrayed Nelsonas an example of a out-of-touch
court gone awry, perhaps the case could better be understood as a missed opportunity for
engaging in these important conversations.

